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Abstract 
The focus of this study is on Article 28E of the Protocol on the Amendments to the Protocol of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights Protocol (Malabo Protocol) which provides for 
the crime of Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG). The jurisdiction to try 
international crimes was conferred on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights in 2008 
when the AU decided to streamline the existing Protocols. This study assesses how far Article 
28E can go to resolve the phenomenon of UCG in Africa. It takes a critical approach to the 
framing of the provision by comparing it to Statutes that previously provided for UCG such as 
the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance. The challenge presented 
by Article 28E is the failure to provide a clear and precise definition for UCG that can serve as 
a guide for the Court when interpreting and applying the provision. The study thus poses that 
the likely consequence of this oversight is that At1icle 28E will prove inadequate to tackle the 
diverse manifestations of UCG in the continent. This requires a revision of the provision to 





The road to Malabo, where the Protocol in question was adopted, traces its development from 
the merger of the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (ACtHPR) and the Court of 
Justice. The ACtHPR was created by a Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's 
Rights (Banjul Charter). The Protocol entered into force on 25 January 2004 to fulfil the 
obligations of safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms in the region. 1 Notably, 
the Court of Justice has never become operational despite having been established by the 
Constitutive Act of the AU.2 
The decision to merge the two Courts was borne in the AU General Assembly of 2005 where 
they opted to create one single judicial body (Merged Court). 3 Thus, the Protocol on the Statute 
of the African Com1 of Justice and Human Rights was adopted on 1 July 2008 (Merger 
Protocol). However, the Merger Protocol does not make it clear which Statute it is annexed to. 
Furthermore, because the Court of Justice Statute never operationalised, the transitional 
provisions in the 2008 Protocol only refer to the ACtHPR Protocol.4 The Merger Protocol has 
not yet come into force due to lack of a minimum number of ratifications in that 28 Member 
States have signed it but only five States have ratified it.5 
The proposal to extend the mandate of the new Merged Court was motivated by specific events 
in the wake of 2008 with European States investigating African State officials and the ICC 
issuing arrest warrants.6 The AU Assembly in consultation with the African Commission 
moved swiftly to begin the process of forming the draft Protocol that would include jurisdiction 
over international crimes. This was in the hope that Africans would no longer be subjected to 
1 Naldi G, 'The African Court of Justice and Human Rights : A Judicial Curate's Egg', International Organizations 
Law Review (2012), 383. 
2 Naldi G, 'The African Court of Justice and Human Rights: A Judicial Curate's Egg' . 
3 Juma D, 'Lost (or Found) in Transition? The Anatomy of the New African Court of Justice and Human Rights ' 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, (2009). See also HoSG, Decision on the merger of the African 
Court on Human and People's Rights and the AU Court of Justice , Assembly/AU/Dec.83(V), 4-5111 July (2005); 
Decision on the seats of the organs of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.45(III) 
4 Article 4-7, Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, (2008) 
5 Naldi G, 'The African Court of Justice and Human Rights : A Judicial Curate's Egg' . 
6 Amnesty International, Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications of the Merged and Expanded 
African Court, 22 January 2016, available at https://www.amnesty .org/en/documents/afrO 1/3063/20 16/en/ on 21 
February 2018. 
foreign courts. After engaging relevant stakeholders, the draft instmment was endorsed. 7 
During the 191h Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly where the Draft Protocol was tabled for 
adoption, it was rejected due to inter alia lack of a definition of the crime of unconstitutional 
change of government.8 The popular debate surrounding forming the definition was whether to 
include popular uprisings. Interesting to note, the Draft Protocol contravenes the ILC Articles 
on State Responsibility by granting immunity, not only to African Heads of State and 
Government (HoSG) but also to an undefined category of senior officials.9 The provision 
containing the crime was left for revision. Despite these reservations, in June 2014, the Malabo 
Protocol was adopted. 10 As of2016 only Kenya, Benin, Congo Brazzaville, Guinea-Bissau and 
Mauritania have ratified the Protocol. 
The foregoing developments culminated in the current provision that is Article 28E which 
provides as follows: 
'1. For the purposes of this Statute, 'unconstitutional change of government' means committing 
or ordering to be committed the following acts, with the aim of illegally accessing or 
maintaining power: 
a) A putsch or coup d'etat against a democratically elected government; 
b) An intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government; 
c) Any replacement of a democratically elected government by the use of armed dissidents or 
rebels or through political assassination; 
d) Any refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party or 
candidate after free, fair and regular elections; 
e) Any amendment or revision of the Constitution or legal instmments, which is an 
infringement on the principles of democratic change of government or is inconsistent with the 
Constitution; 
f) Any substantial modification to the electoral laws in the last six (6) months before the 
elections without the consent of the majority of the political actors. 
2. For purposes of this Statute, "democratically elected government" has the same meaning as 
contained in AU instmments.' 
7 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afrOl/3063/2016/en/ on 21 February 2018. 
8 Decision on the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, Assembly/AU/Dec.427(XIX), para 2. 
9 Article 1, paragraph 1, International Law Commission Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts ,3 August 200 I , Supplement No. I 0 (A/5611 0), chp.I. V.E. l. See al so 
https://www .amnesty.org/en/documents/afrO 1/3063/20 16/en/ on 21 February 2018. 
10 https://www .amnesty.org/en/documents/afrO 1/3063/20 16/en/ on 21 February 2018 . 
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The Malabo Protocol has jurisdiction over 14 different crimes. 11 The most problematic to 
define has been that of the UCG. This may be due to the diverse manifestations it has had in 
Africa. The inclusion of this crime has been due to the resurgence of military coups which have 
been a big weakness in the functioning of democratic societies in post-colonial Africa. 12 So far, 
the most detailed legal instruments developed by the AU in response to UCGs is the 
Constitutive Act of the AU. Secondly, the Lome Declaration on the Framework for an OAU 
Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (Lome Declaration) 13 which was the 
first attempt to describing UCGs and thirdly the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance (ACDEG) 14 which expanded the definition provided in the Lome Declaration. The 
policy position of the AU through these instruments has been to maintain a strict adherence to 
the ptinciples of good governance, and the strengthening of democratic institutions. 
Notew01thy, these policy actions were very instrumental in drafting Article 28E. Further, 
because it is a new Statutory crime, the Court has no jurisprudence to build on. Be that as it 
may, the rationale to include the crime outweighs the challenges that have surrounded it. UCGs 
have been blamed by HoSG as being the essential causes of instability, insecurity and violent 
conflict in Africa. 15 In fact, they would particularly take an interest in this crime because it 
poses the biggest threat to their peaceful continuous regimes. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Article 28E of the Malabo Protocol sets out the crime of UCG. It lists six specific acts that 
would constitute UCG ranging from a coup d'etat to changing the electoral laws six months 
before the general elections without the consent of the majority of the political actors. 16 This 
underscores the first problem, that the scope provided is too narrow to adequately capture the 
diverse manifestations that this crime can take and has taken in the past. By providing a list of 
scenarios rather than a legal definition the provision diminishes the prospects of its 
applicability. For example, the unconstitutional persistence of governments through 
11 Article 28A, Protocol on Amendments of the Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
12 Souare I, The AU and the challenge of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, ISS Paper 197, 
Institute for Security Studies, August 2009, 1. 
13 Lome Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government , (12 
July 2000), AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI). 
14 Article 23(5), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, (2004). 
15 Souare I, The AU and the challenge of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, 3. 
16 Article 28E, Protocol on Amendments of the Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
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conducting fraudulent elections is a form of UCG that has not been included in the list. These 
occunences happened in Kenya in 2007, Ethiopia in 20 l 0 and Zimbabwe in 2008. 17 
Additionally, the management of this crime has also been varied depending on the specific 
country, for example, some countries will insist that a successful insurgent government conduct 
an election to legitimize themselves. Furthennore, the AU itself has responded differently to 
the 80 military coups that have occuned between 1956 and 200 l. 18 The concern here is that 
the weak provision will highlight the imbalance of the AU's legal and normative approach to 
the crime. 
This lack of a uniform approach will continue to be solidified by the fact that the definition of 
the crime itself is too nanow. It is worth noting that the scenarios depicted in Article 28E are 
substantially similar to the definition provided in the Lome Declaration. 19 This in itself is a 
problem because this definition has proven to be insufficient. Rather than adopt a forward-
looking approach it only covers, in the broadest terms, instances that are no longer being 
witnessed in the modern era. Accordingly, it can be concluded that this approach will not stand. 
This is to say that it will not stand the test of time. 
1.3 Statement of Objectives 
The general aim of this paper would be to highlight the particular nuances of the main problem 
stated above. The specific objective is to assess how far Article 28E will go to solve the crime 
of unconstitutional changes in government. Further, looking at past occunences of UCGs in 
Africa and how they were managed by the relevant States and the AU to pinpoint a possible 
solution to the quagmire that has been left by the provision in the Malabo Protocol. 
1.4 Hypotheses 
Noting the problems above, this study hypothesises the following: 
l. Article 28E will prove to be inadequate in prosecuting UCGs in Africa; this will 
squander the effort put in to include the provision on the Malabo Protocol. 
17 Albab T, 'African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights: Prospects and Challenges of Prosecuting 
Unconstitutional changes of Government as an International Crime' Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of 
Mauritius, 31 October 2012,35. 
18 Souare I, 'The AU and the challenge of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa', Institute for Security 
Studies, August 2009, 7. 
19 Lome Declaration on the Framework for an OA U Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, ( 12 
July 2000), AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI). 
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2. The Merged Court will have an uphill task in interpreting the provision due to the 
reasons provided. This may lead to an overly broad interpretation that will open the 
floodgates of prosecution, or altemately, a narrow interpretation that might cause a 
similar outcome as presupposed in the first hypothesis. 
1.5 Research Questions 
This study will be guided by the following questions aimed at proving the hypothesis. 
1. How does the historical normative and legislative framework of the AU for UCGs 
inform the interpretation of Article 28E? 
2. What are the content and substantive deficiencies of Article 28E as a criminal legal 
provision? 
3. What are the challenges and prospects of resolving UCGs m Africa and creating 
systematic jurisprudence on the same? 
1.6 Theoretical Framework 
This study will be underpinned by the theory of the rule of law. This theory has two 
conceptions, the formal elements and the procedural elements. The formal elements bring out 
the substance of the text to ensure that it is inter alia clear, certain, predictable while the 
procedural elements ask how the law is applied, the institutions and judges who determine if 
the law has been breached. 
Further relevant to this theory is the maxim nullum crimen sine lege. AV Dicey's first out of 
three conceptions of the rule of law is that no man can lawfully be made to suffer in body or 
goods unless for the distinct breach of the law.20 This is drawn from the doctrine of strict 
legality which postulates that a person may only be held criminally liable if at the time of 
performing the act in question it was regarded as a criminal offence.21 Montesquieu particularly 
developed the value of legalism which looked down on how despotic governments enacted 
very simple laws that had no procedural delicacy. 22 Legalism was necessary to restrain the 
power of the ruler and safeguard the prerogatives of the legislature and the judiciary.23 This 
20 Dicey A, The Law of the Constitution, Oxford University Press, 2013 . 
21 Cassese A et al, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2013, 24. 
22 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, France, 1748. 
23 Cassese A eta!, International Criminal Law, 25. 
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came to be seen as the mle oflaw which obligated both the mlers and citizens to obey the law. 
Additionally, it requires that the law conform to certain minimum standards ofjustice.24 
The law in Article 28E is too narrow therefore, not broad or complex enough to determine what 
exactly amounts to UCG. This leaves it open and creates a lot of uncertainty. Consequently, 
where the law is uncertain it undermines the mle of law. 
1. 7 Literature review 
This review will be divided into three parts, first briefly on the merge of the ACtHPR and the 
Court of Justice, secondly on the empowerment of the Merged Court to try International crimes, 
and finally on UCG's in Africa. 
1.7.1 The Merged Court 
G Naldi's article 'The African Court of Justice and Human Rights : A Judicial Curate's Egg' 
provides an interesting critique on the viability of the Merged Comt taking into account the 
slow operation of the first two. 25 He provides an overview of the new Court and its similarity 
to the International Comt of Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
Additionally, he assesses the initial reception of the Merged Court and the position it has taken 
in the International Community. 
Dan Juma's 'Lost (or Found) in Transition? The Anatomy of the New African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights'.26 This author argues that the merger of the two Courts is a transition. He 
develops this argument by examining whether the African Human Rights system has gained or 
lost prospects in the transition. Ultimately, he concludes that the Merged Court may not be able 
to solve the normative and institutional deficiencies of the system. It will continue to be a work 
in progress inevitably lying in the hands of the African Commission. 
1.7.2 The empowerment ofthe Merged Court to try International crimes 
Amnesty International, 'Legal and Institutional Implications of the Merged and Expanded 
African Court' which traces the history of adding a criminal jurisdiction.27 This paper studies 
24 Mbondenyi M and Ambani J, The New Constitutional Law of Kenya: Principles, Government & Human Rights , 
Claripress Ltd Nairobi, 2012. 
25 Naldi G, 'The African Court of Justice and Human Rights: A Judicial Curate's Egg' . 
26 Juma D, 'Lost (or Found) in Transition? The Anatomy of the New African Court of Justice and Human Rights' . 
27 https://www.amnesty.org/en/clocuments/afrOl/3063/20 16/en/ on 21 February 2018. 
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the possible effects of the criminal jurisdiction on relevant stakeholders such as victims of gross 
violations and the AU. The purpose of this policy paper is to generate a discussion amongst the 
stakeholders on the implications ofthe Malabo Protocol. 
Don Deya's much cited article 'Worth the Wait: Pushing for The African Court to exercise 
Jurisdiction for International Crimes' which provides the reasons for the expansion and an 
overview of the succession of African International Courts thus far. 28 
1.7.3 UCG in Africa 
Shola Omotola's 'Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa' whose main concern is 
the consolidation of democracy in Africa.29 He explores the different forms of UCG and the 
institutional mechanisms of preventing them. The paper draws from empirical data to suggest 
that the current trend will be of great consequence to the democratic stability of Kenya. This 
author suggests that the problem of UCGs stems from the different democratic processes in 
Africa. An examination of the political institutional mechanisms is critical for preventing UCG. 
1.8 Research Methodology 
This study will be conducted using primary data obtained from Statutes, legal instruments such 
as Malabo Protocol and the Lome Declaration. It will also make use of statistics provided by 
the AU resources on facts such as the number of military coups that have taken place within a 
specified period of time. Secondary sources will be of most use, journal articles, judicial 
precedents, textbooks if any. Moreover, the study will adopt a qualitative approach to analyse 
the data obtained. This is necessary in order to fulfil the objectives listed above. These are the 
most appropriate methods because they contain the most informative data which are easily 
accessible. The method chosen also arranges the information needed in a format that can easily 
be transferred into this current study. 
1.9 Limitations 
First, the use of secondary sources creates challenges of access to authentic information. The 
most ideal methodology would have been to acquire information from the drafters of the 
Protocol. However, to mitigate these challenges the paper will give special attention to scholars 
28 Deya D, 'Worth the Wait: Pushing for The African Court to exercise Jurisdiction for International Crimes' . 
29 Omotola J, 'Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa: What implications for Democratic 
consolidation?', Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2011, 5. 
7 
who have been able to conduct interviews with the drafters of the Protocol. For example, 
Tesfaye Albab in his LLM thesis. 30 
1.10 Chapter Breakdown 
Chapter one will lay the foundation for the paper, providing the background of the study, the 
problem arising and the objectives of the paper. Further, it will provide the hypothesis and how 
this relates with the research questions. 
Chapter two will discuss the rule of law and how it relates with Article 28E. The rule of law 
and its two main features will be used to critique Article 28E. This chapter will also provide 
reasons for foregoing democracy as the underpinning theory although, on the face of it, 
democracy and UCG are closely connected. 
Chapter three will begin by looking at the data establishing UCG thus asserting the significance 
of the study. Thereafter, a historical appraisal of the development of Article 28E will be 
necessary to understand why it was drafted in the manner that it was and how this subsequently 
will affect the way it will be applied. 
Chapter four will address the challenges of Article 28E, first from a substantive perspective 
then from a procedural perspective. The substantive aspect will involve an investigation into 
whether A1ticle 28E meets the standard required for criminal provisions and the procedural 
aspect will be assess how the application of the provision will bring about inconsistencies. 
Chapter five concludes the study by providing the research findings and offering 
recommendations to the challenges that have been highlighted. 
30 Albab T, 'African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples ' Rights : Prospects and Challenges of Prosecuting 





This study will be underpinned by the theory of the rule oflaw. The current provision of Article 
28E infringes on the rule of law in the following ways. First, it does not adhere to the formal 
legal requirements of clear and determinate rules . Secondly, the procedural requirements have 
not been met. Leaving the Court with wide discretionary powers undermines separation of 
powers leading the judges to usurp the powers of the legislators. 
The chapter will begin with a short discussion on the rule of law. It will rely on John Locke's 
formulation and Brian Tamanaha's subsequent modem conception. The first section will 
outline the fotmal requirements, patiicularly focusing on the rule of clear, detetminate and 
predictable nmms, not those that are vague or contestable. This section will look at the work 
of Lon Fuller and John Locke. The second section will outline the procedural aspects with 
focus on the requirement of an institution to adjudge those who breach the law. The procedural 
elements have to do with the institutions established to enforce the law and the processes by 
which the law is administered.31 This will lay the basis for a discussion on Montesquieu's 
conception of the separation of powers. The third section will be on the relationship between 
the rule of law and democracy. Although they are heavily dependent on each other, democracy 
as a theory is not included in the definition of the rule of law. This section will explain the 
reasons why democracy is not be suitable for such a study and the prevalence of the rule of 
law. 
1.1 Definition of the Rule of Law 
The rule of law is understood to mean that governments and citizens are bound by and abide 
by the law.32 Both the government and the citizen are important components because they 
contribute to the realisation of the rule oflaw. Governments should operate within a framework 
of law that they are accountable to. Additionally, the rule of law is a major source for the 
legitimation of governments.33 Similarly, citizens are required to obey legal nmms even those 
they disagree with. The protection of the law ought to be accessed by everyone. Access 
comprising not only public knowledge but also clarity and the capability to understand and 
31 The Rule ofLaw, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 22 June 2016 https: //plato.stanford .edu/entri es/rul e-
of- law/#FormP rocSubsRegu on 9 November 201 8. 
32 Tamanaha 8 , 'The History and Elements of The Rule of Law' , Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, (2012) 233 . 
33 Tamanaha 8, 'The History and Elements of The Rule of Law', 237 . 
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intemalize it. These features relate to the f01mal and procedural aspects of the rule oflaw which 
shall be discussed in tum. 
The character of the rule of law manifests itself in two forms, the formal elements and the 
procedural elements. The formal elements require that laws are general, widely promulgated, 
clear and determinate. The procedural aspects connote the practical way laws should be applied 
and administered. Some of the procedural requirements include that hearings against a suspect 
be conducted by an independent and impartial tribunal, due process procedures such as access 
to evidence, right to legal counsel and right to defence, additionally, a defendant has the right 
to a reasoned judgement and the penalty imposed should be a consequence of imposing the 
law.34 
The first element investigates the substance of the rules. It also questions how they came into 
being and if they followed due process. The second element is more concemed with how the 
rule is applied to the citizen. This is the adjudicative process which has come to be codified as 
fair trial rights. 
1.2 The Formal Elements of the Rule of Law 
Lon Fuller through his book, The Morality of Law describes eight principles for the rule of law. 
He creates the basic criteria for effective legislation that is instrumentally valuable. They 
include; generality, promulgation, prospectivity, clarity, non-contradiction, constancy and they 
must not ask the impossible.35 According to Fuller, there exists a moral obligation to obey the 
law that stems from the nature of law itself. This obligation was due to the connection between 
law and morality. He went on to state that the ability to abide by these criteria underscored the 
success of lawmakers. The fidelity to the law by the citizens was conditional on the actions of 
govemment officials. 36 The citizens cannot reasonably be expected to follow those rules that 
are not determinate or even known. They must be capable of being obeyed before they can be 
obeyed. There is an expectation by the citizenry that the govemment will fulfil its duty to the 
rule of law. This is necessary for their political relationship to be sustained. Fuller describes 
this relationship as a reciprocal one. The duty of one to act depends on the behaviour of others. 37 
34 Tashima A, 'The War ofTerror and the Rule of Law', Asian American Law Journal, (2008), 248 . 
35 Fuller L, The Morality of law, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964,637. 
36 Murphy C, 'Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law' , Law and Philosophy, 24, (2005), 240. 
37 Murphy C, 'Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law', 242. 
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One of the things that people wanted escape in the state of nature was people's incalculable 
opinions.38 This was John Locke's view in his second of the Two Treatise of Government where 
he emphasized the importance of predictability of positive law. 39 The problem with the state of 
nature is that everyone has a different synthesis of what the law ought to be. One person's 
conclusions may not be the same as another even though they were both thinking hard about 
the same thing. Evidence of this unpredictability is currently present in Article 28E. The gap 
will force the judges to make their own deductions to supplement the missing information. 
Drawing from Locke's treatise, observably, this may create tension in consequent judgments. 
1.3 The Procedural Elements of the Rule of Law 
The formal substantive elements are complemented by procedural aspects of the rule of law.40 
It can be argued that the procedural aspects are of more significance to the ordinaty person.41 
This is because they present the instances when they have real interactions with the law. 
Therefore, it becomes impmtant to them that the rule of law is adhered to. Support for this is 
observed in the legislation of procedural aspects as core rights in numerous Constitutions.42 
Further, even where the substantive aspects are failing the only recourse is to the procedural 
elements to correct this failure. For example, in Kenya one may challenge an unconstitutional 
Statute in the High Court.43 
The relevant procedural element for this paper is the right to have an independent and impartial 
tribunal. Article 28E will present a challenge to the ACtHPR because it does not offer much 
guidance for interpretation. Thus, the Court will be forced to employ wide discretionary powers 
when an unconventional case is presented to them. Undoubtably, this will infringe on the 
constitutional principle of separation of powers. 
Montesquieu is recognised for providing the best account on this perspective of the rule oflaw. 
He proffered that the judiciary should be separated from the executive and the legislator. It 
should be able to remain the mouthpiece of the law without being distracted by the work of 
38 Locke J, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, Awnsham Churchill, London, 1689, 7. 
39 The Rule of Law, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 22 June 2016 https: //plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-
of-law/#FormProcSubsRequ on 9 November 2018. 
40 The Rule of Law, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 22 June 2016 https: //plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-
of-law/#FormProcSubsRequ on 9 November 2018 . 
41 The Rule of Law, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 22 June 2016 https: //plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-
of-law/#FormProcSubsRequ on 9 November 2018. 
42 Article 49 ,50, Constitution of Kenya (20 1 0). 
43 Article 165(3)d, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
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legislators.44 Montesquieu particularly developed the value of legalism which looked down on 
how despotic governments enacted very simple laws that had no procedural delicacy.45 
Legalism was necessary to retrain the power of the ruler and safeguard the prerogative of the 
legislature and the judiciary.46 This came to be seen as the rule oflaw which obligated both the 
rulers and citizens to obey the law. 
Consequently, the law in Article 28E is too narrow and thus this undermines the rule of law 
and legalism by failing to implicitly respect the strict role that the judiciary plays in interpreting 
laws. A role that should always remain distinct from the legislature. 
1.4 Rule of Law Distinguished from Democracy 
When describing good governance, rule of law and democracy have become inseparable 
concepts. These are two distinct systems of political organization.47 Democracy requires that 
political power be held by representatives elected in free and regularly scheduled elections.48 
Rule oflaw, however, provides that political power be exercised49 through generally applicable 
rules regarding the formal and procedural elements mentioned above. The distinction is that 
democracy refers to the method by which political rulers are appointed while the rule of law is 
concerned with how political power is exercised. 50 Although distinct the two are interdependent 
values that make complimentary contributions to good governance. Democracy is associated 
with a wide array of civil rights that can only be protected by the rule of law. 51 
For example, the rule of law requires that every person is equal and their interests m 
government should be considered in equal measure. 52 This is necessary for democratic ideals 
to be achieved. These include the equal consideration of interests when it comes to voting. 53 
Further, rule of law ensures the respect for election results and other such legal entitlements in 
a democracy. 54 
44 The Rule of Law, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 22 June 2016 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-
of-law/#FormProcSubsRequ on 9 November 2018. 
45 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, France, 1748. 
46 Cassese A eta/, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2013, 25. 
47 Ash T, A Little Democracy is a Dangerous Thing-So Let's Have More of It, The Guardian, 2 August 2006, 
http:// www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/03/usa.syria on 9 November 2018. 
48 Hendricks F, Vital Democracy: A Theory of Democracy in Action, Oxford Scholarship Online, London 2010, 
22 (There are various forms of democracies as explained by Hendriks in his book, this is only a basic definition) 
49 Pennock J, Administration and The Rule of Law, Farrar and Rinehart Incorporated, Canberra, 1941, 15. 
50 Raban 0, 'The Rationalization of Policy: On the Relation Between Democracy and The Rule of Law', 18 
Legislation and Public Policy, (2015), 46. 
51 Raban 0, 'The Rationalization of Policy: On the Relation Between Democracy and The Rule of Law' , 48. 
52 Akech M, Administrative Law, Strathmore University Press, Nairobi, 2016, 9 
53 Dahl RA, Democracy and its Critics, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989, 84,86. 
54 Akech M, Administrative Law, 13. 
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With respect to this paper, there are three reasons for foregoing democracy and adopting the 
rule of law perspective to the subject matter. Firstly, democracy by itself cannot ensure the 
attainment of fundamental civil rights such as liberty and equality. It is possible for a 
representative govemment to fail to act within the interests of the demos.55 Thus, govemment 
officials must operate 'within a limiting framework of the law' .56 They should respect the 
existing law and even where they want to change the existing law they ought to respect the 
restraints imposed on them. 57 In most recent liberal democracies this limitation is found in the 
Constitution. Consequently, the rule of law has been considered the essence of 
constitutionalism. 58 
Secondly, the principles forming the rule of law are more applicable in this context because 
they promote certainty, predictability and security. This is discernible between the govemment 
and its citizens and between citizens themselves. 59 Hence a peaceful social order is maintained 
through legal rules. There exist reliable expectations of conduct with each party fulfilling their 
duties.60 
Thirdly, not all African countries are democratic in how they organize political power. For 
example, Morocco, Lesotho and Swaziland remain the last three monarchies in Africa.61 The 
Sahel State ofNiger, Sudan, Eritrea and Algeria are States that are govemed in an authoritarian 
manner. 62 There are those with partial democracies and complete breakdown of the govemment 
systems. Therefore, it would be improper to impose the ideal of democracy on a Statute that is 
designed to apply to the whole of Africa. Indeed, African Statutes ought to be drafted in view 
of the diverse nature of African States. 
Thus, the interpretation of Article 28E should take a forward-looking approach that prohibits 
partial democracies and representative govemments that find legal means of manipulating the 
law totally disregarding the interests of the citizenry. 
55 Akech M, Administrative Law, 5. 
56 Tamanaha B, 'A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law', Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 115. 
57 Akech M, Administrative Law, 9. 
58 Akech M, Administrative Law, 9. 
59 Tamanaha B, 'A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law' 8. 
60 Tamanaha B, 'A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law' 10. 
61 Ademola A, Africa's Last Three Monarchies and Why They Remain Standing, 12 February 2018, 
https: //face?faceafrica .com/article/africas-last-three-monarchies-remain-standing on 9 November 2018 
62 Koch A et al, 'Profiteers of Migration? Authoritarian States in Africa and European Migration Management' , 
4, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, (20 18), 1. 
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Having heavily relied on Fuller's account of the Rule of law, it is necessary at this point to 
assess his responses to criticisms from HLA Hart. 63 The main objection was that the rule of 
law is only instrumentally morally valuable, that is valuable to the extent that the legal system 
pursues morally good ends.64 Fuller responds that the rule of law is conditionally non-
instrumentally valuable as well. This is by how the legal system structures its political 
relationships. There is a moral basis for the duties of citizens and government officials. 
Conclusion 
The problem articulated by Article 28E of the Malabo protocol presents a challenge to the mle 
of law. The provision is not determinate and cannot therefore, be conclusively be relied upon. 
The African Union is failing in its responsibility to uphold the mle of law. This will result in 
the States not accepting to be governed by the Malabo Protocol. Reciprocity is only required 
when both parties respect their duties to one another. This is already evidenced by the slow 
ratifications of the Malabo Protocol. Additionally, the missing guidance from the provision has 
left wide discretionary powers of interpretation to the judges. This conflicts with the purpose 
of separation of powers. Essentially, the ACtHPR will have to extend the application of Alticle 
28E through its judgements. Judgements that the Court could always review. Further, this 
creates an uncertain position on the matter. 
For this paper, rule of law was elected over democracy. Democracy as a political ideal has an 
appreciation of numerous values that are similar with the rule oflaw. However, the vast forms 
of democracy are incapable of securing all the values that required by the rule oflaw. Moreover, 
A1ticle 28E cannot be cured by imposing democratic ideals and it would be unsuitable to expect 
the standard of democracy for all African States. 
Finally, the rule of law as espoused by Fuller is morally valuable independent of the goals set 
by the legal system it seeks to establish. It develops a worthwhile criterion for creating just 
laws that ensure healthy political relationships between the government and the governed. 
63 HartH, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, London, 1965. 
64 Murphy C, 'Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law', 246. 
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CHAPTER3 
A HISTORICAL APPRAISAL OF THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR UCGS 
IN AFRICA 
Introduction 
Article 28E presents a challenge to the rule of law in Africa as was concluded in the previous 
chapter. It is from this backdrop that this current chapter will first look at the significance of 
combating UCGs in the region. Democratic instability and good governance have been a 
challenge in post-colonial Africa, this is the position asserted by the empirical data presented. 
Following this, the study will move onto how the provision was developed from the antecedent 
Statutes concerned with popular participation and good governance in Africa. The historical 
development is key to understanding why the provision has taken its current form. Furthermore, 
this chapter addresses the subsequent challenges that arise from such a formulation. 
Thereafter, the chapter will endeavour to examine the deficiencies of Article 28E. The first is 
based on its content as a legal provision. This part will analyse the substance of the provision 
and why its current formulation is problematic. Secondly, the procedural challenges will be 
addressed, this regards the difficulties that will arise when applying this provision to the various 
possible circumstances that could constitute UCG. 
3.1 The Significance of Prohibiting UCGs in Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa has suffered 80 coups and 180 attempted coups between 1951 and 2001.65 
They were particularly prevalent during the fight for independence and started to taper off at 
the start ofthe 2P1 century.66 The occurrence of coups and other forms ofUCG is attributed to 
autocratic rule and the absence of legitimate means of changing govemments.67 It is thus, 
necessary to create a legal framework that will effectively prevent African countiies from being 
the victims of this scourge. 
65 Vandeginste S, 'The African Union, Constitutionalism and Power-sharing' , JOB Working Paper, (20 11) 7. 
66 Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2011: Democracy under stress, 2011 , 26. 
67 Albab T, 'African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights : Prospects and Challenges of Prosecuting 
Unconstitutional changes of Government as an International Crime' , 46. 
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Table 1: Coups d'etat in Africa between 1958 and 2008 
Region Country Year Total 
West Africa Benin 1963, 1965 (x2), 1967, 1969, 1972 6 
Burkina Faso 1980, 1982, 1983, 1987 4 
Cote D'Ivoire 1999 1 
Gambia 1994 1 
Ghana 1966, 1972, 1978, 1981 4 
Guinea 1984,2008 2 
Guinea-Bissau 1980,2003 2 
Liberia 1980 1 
Mali 1968, 1991 2 
Niger 1976, 1996 2 
Nigeria 1966 (x2), 1975, 1983, 1985, 1993 6 
Sierra Leone 1967, 1968, 1992, 1997 4 
Togo 1963,1967,2005 3 
Central Africa Burundi 1966(x2), 1976,1987,1996 5 
CAR 1966,1979,1981,2003 4 
Chad 1975, 1979, 1990 3 
Congo-Brazzaville 1968, 1999 1 
DRC 1965, 1964 2 
Equatorial Guinea 1979 1 
Rwanda 1973 1 
East Aftica Somalia 1969 1 
Sudan 1958, 196~ 1985, 1989 4 
Uganda 1966, 1971, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1986 6 
Southern Africa Lesotho 1986, 1991 2 
N 01th Africa Algeria 1965 1 
Libya 1969 1 
16 
Mauritius 1978,1984,2005,2009 4 
Tunisia 1987 
Source: Adapted from Jeune Afrique 2516, March 2009, and souare (2006), as reproduced in Zounmenou (2009 ). 
3.2 A Historical Appraisal of Article 28E on the Normative and Legislative 
Framework of the AU 
The first key document concerned with good governance in Africa was the African Charter for 
Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (ACPPDT). It was adopted in 1990 
during the International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development 
Process in Africa that was held in Arusha, Tanzania.68 It entrenched the idea that 'inevitably 
and irresistibly, popular participation will have a role to play in Africa. ' 69 This was done under 
the initiative of the submissions of different NGOs to the UN General Assembly. The 
Conference was organised by the Economic Commission of Africa in collaboration with the 
UN.70 At the time there was growing concern over the serious deterioration in the human rights 
and economic conditions during the 1980s.71 The objectives of the Conference were to 
recognize the role of people's participation in Africa's development efforts, identify obstacles 
and define appropriate approaches to the promotion of popular participation, among others. 72 
Developments such as ACPPDT were necessary because most UCGs were occurring against 
authoritarian regimes, the democracies in Africa were hardly Constitutional, therefore, the 
unconstitutional change was in an effort to restore democracy. 73 
The second key document of the Organisation of Afiican Unity (OAU) in respect ofUCG was 
the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of 
Govemment.74 It was adopted during the annual summit of the OAU in Lome, Togo in July 
2000. This was the earliest attempt by the OAU to define and ban UCG. Aiming to preserve 
68 African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, (16 February 1990) 
69 Paragraph 37, African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, (16 February 
1990) 
70 Paragraph 1, African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, (16 February 
1990) 
71 Paragraph 3, African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, (16 February 
1990) 
72 Paragraph 4, African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, (16 February 
1990) 
73 Sturman K, 'Unconstitutional Changes of Government: The Democrat's Dilemma in Africa' 30 South African 
Institute of International Affairs, (20 11) 2. 
74 Lome Declaration on the Framework for an OA U Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government . 
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the ongomg democratisation in the continent, 75 the Lome Declaration reveals a strong 
prominence on the principles of democratic governance to be adhered by all OAU States. This 
included the adoption of a democratic Constitution, political pluralism or any other form of 
pa11icipatory democracy. 76 The HoSG equated democracy to the reduction ofUCG. The Lome 
Declaration lists four main instances of UCG as stated below: 
• Military coup d'etat against a democratically elected government 
• Intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government 
• Replacement of democratically elected governments by armed dissident groups and 
rebel movements; and 
• The refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning political 
party after free, fair and regular elections 77 
This instrument has been criticised for lacking binding force as it is only a Declaration, thus, it 
largely depends on the political will of the member States. Nevertheless, this does not negate 
its contribution as a guiding document to provide a course of conduct. 78 
The third main document prohibiting UCG in Africa is the Constitutive Act of the AU which 
was adopted in 2000 in Lome, Togo. This effectively replaced the OAU Charter. The main 
goal of the OAU was to rid the African Continent of colonialism, to attain this it had to 
emphasis on principles such as state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Values such as human 
rights, conflict management and socio-economic integration of the Continent were left out. 79 
The AU sought to fill the gaps left by the OAU. 
Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act, condemns and rejects UCG.80 Article 30 prohibits 
governments that have come into power through unconstitutional means from participating in 
the activities of the AUY Nonetheless, the Constitutive Act is not conclusive because it does 
75 Dersso S, 'Unconstitutional Changes of Government and Unconstitutional Practices in Africa' 2 Africa Politics, 
Africa Peace (2016) 3. 
76 Albab T, 'African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights: Prospects and Challenges of Prosecuting 
Unconstitutional changes of Government as an International Crime', 12. 
77 Lome Declaration on the Framework for an OA U Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government . 
78 Sharamo R, Programme Head of the Conflict Prevention Programme at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 
in Addis Ababa. 
79 Kindiki K, 'The Normative and Institutional Framework of the African Union Relating to the Protection of 
Human Rights and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: A Critical Appraisal' ,3 African Human 
rights Journal, (2003) 97-118. 
80 Article 4(p), Constitutive Act of the African Union, 7 November 2000, 37733 
81 Article 30, Constitutive Act of the African Union . 
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not provide for a definition of UCG. Therefore, the Lome Declaration complements it in this 
regard. Fmther, it builds on the sanctions to be imposed by the AU in instances of UCG. 
Noteworthy, the Constitutive Act has been ratified by all member States of the AU and is 
therefore binding in contrast to the Lome Declaration. 
Finally, the fourth key document is the ACDEG which was adopted on 30 January 2007 in 
Addis Ababa. It entered into force on 15 February 2012 after receiving fifteen ratifications. By 
September 2017, it had received thirty ratifications and has been signed by forty-five States.82 
This was the first direct attempt to legislate on UCG.83 It was developed from the Lome 
Declaration and has since added a fifth situation of UCG to be found in Article 23(5) which 
provides that UCG includes 'any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal 
instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government. ' 84 
Additionally, it expanded the measures to be taken against UCG and it strengthened the 
sanctions regime. 85 
Article 14(2) provides that State parties should take legislative and regulatory measures to 
ensure perpetrators are dealt with according to the law. 86 Article 25( 4) provides that 
perpetrators are not allowed to participate in elections held to restore democratic order or hold 
any position of responsibility in the political institutions of their State.87 Further, Article 25(5) 
provides that perpetrators may be tried before any competent court of the AU. 
Article 28E is mainly modelled on the Lome Declaration, therefore, the provisions are similar. 
The Lome Declaration did not provide for fraudulent elections including rigging and 
manipulating the election process. Article 28E(l)(d) which provides for the refusal of 
incumbents to relinquish power after conducting free and fair election was extracted from the 
Lome Declaration in its entirety. This provision does not acknowledge the challenge of 
fraudulent elections in Africa. 88 which may be referTed to as the unconstitutional persistence of 
governments. Evidence of this is drawn from the Ethiopian elections in 2010. The incumbent 
managed to secure 99.6% of the seats in Parliament. There was complete absence of the 
82 Aniekwe C, Oette L, The lOth Anniversary of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
83 Albab T, 'African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights: Prospects and Challenges of Prosecuting 
Unconstitutional changes of Government as an International Crime', 14. 
84 Article 23(5), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, (2004). 
85 Dersso S, 'Unconstitutional Changes of Government and Unconstitutional Practices in Africa' 3 
86 Article 14(2), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, (2004). 
87 Article 25(4), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, (2004). 
88 Albab T, 'African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights: Prospects and Challenges of Prosecuting 
Unconstitutional changes of Government as an International Crime' ,35 
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conditions for a free or fair election. This includes lack of meaningful participation, fear among 
voters and candidates to discuss their policy proposals. 89 
Furthennore, Article 23(5) of ACDEG has been replicated under A1ticle 28E (l)e of the 
Malabo Protocol. This sub-section prohibits amendments or revision to the Constitution and 
legal instruments in contravention of principles of democratic change of government. 90 
Certainly, this has been a challenge in Africa in the past. The most common form is the 
extension of term limits successfully completed by Tandja Mamadou of Niger in 2010, Ismail 
Omar Guelleh of Djibouti in 2010, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria in 2008 and Paul Biya of 
Cameroon in 2008.91 The issue here is that the AU has not been active in responding to this 
form of UCG and there is doubt on whether the Court will be any different. 92 
The challenges brought about by Article 28E ultimately result in how the provision has been 
drafted. There is a demonstrated lack of substantive sufficiency and procedural delicacy. The 
provision was not a new invention by the drafters of the Malabo Protocol, rather it was an 
innovation from the antecedent Statutes discussed above. This reveals that the drafters built 
upon the existing definitions of UCG within the AU legal framework oblivious to the fact that 
such an approach may possibly create gaps. 
It thus necessary to subsequently examine the meaning of UCG free from any pre-conceived 
notions or ideas. At the heart of unconstitutional rule, power is obtained and transferred through 
the use or the threat of use of force. Further, the Constitution and other electoral laws are 
typically abrogated, suspended or significantly amended to terminate the normal democratic 
process.93 
Conclusion 
The efforts toward democratic consolidation and stability in Africa has been a long-convoluted 
journey. Albeit with difficulties, AU member States have continuously sought to ensure peace, 
security and stability. 94 This is witnessed from the Statutes preceding the Malabo Protocol 
89 Albab T, 'African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights : Prospects and Challenges of Prosecuting 
Unconstitutional changes of Government as an International Crime',35. 
90 Article 28E (l)e, Protocol on Amendments of the Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
91 'Changing the Constitution to remain in power' 20 December 2013 https: //www.france24.com/en/20091023-
changing-constitution-remain-oower on 16 January 20 19; Omotola S, 'Unconstitutional changes of government 
in Africa. What Implications for Democratic Consolidation?' 29. 
92 Albab T, 'African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights : Prospects and Challenges of Prosecuting 
Unconstitutional changes of Government as an International Crime ' , 36. 
93 Ndulo M, Th e African Union, Legal and Institutional Framework, Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2012, 253 
94 Preamble, Protocol on Amendments of the Protocol on th e African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
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which affirm the commitment to rid the continent of the scourge ofUCG. One possible reason 
for this is that HoSG recognise that UCG is a real threat to their tenure in office irrespective of 
whether they assumed power through legitimate means. 
Be that as it may, this visionary aspiration is not followed through when the provision is drafted 
in the Malabo Protocol. The Statute is marred with simple errors that are an affront to the 
principles of international criminal law. Subsequently, this causes complications to the Merged 
Court when determining their range of interpretation, carefully balancing between the intention 
of the drafters and the interest of the accused persons. 
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CHAPTER4 
PROSPECTIVE CHALLENGES WITH THE INTERPRETATION AND 
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 28E 
Introduction 
The preceding chapter assessed the historical normative and legislative framework of the AU 
for combating UCGs in Africa in an effort to rationalise Article 28E. This discussion revealed 
that Article 28E was the product of amending preceding provisions on UCG. This was not the 
best approach considering that the Statutes that it was built upon had their own share of 
difficulties. Thus, the challenges were simply transferred onto the Malabo Protocol. One 
tangible challenge is the fact that Article 28E was developed from political policy instruments, 
but the Malabo Protocol is intended to be a criminal statute. This creates a discrepancy between 
the standards required for a general policy treaty and a criminal statute. Furthermore, the 
prospects of successfully prosecuting UCG under Article 28E look dim. Not only is the political 
will to ratify the Protocol discouraging but also there are real concerns over the impact on the 
principle of non-intervention. 
Consequently, this chapter endeavours to examine the deficiencies of Article 28E. The first is 
based on its content as a legal provision. This part will analyse the substance of the provision 
and why its current formulation is problematic. Secondly, the procedural challenges will be 
addressed, this regards the difficulties that will arise when applying this provision to the various 
possible circumstances that could constitute UCG. Finally, an assessment of the modern 
manifestations of UCG that have not been catered for by Article 28E. 
4.1 An Evaluation of the Substance and Content of Article 28E as a Criminal Legal 
Provision 
The Malabo Protocol has been adopted as an International Criminal law Statute and therefore, 
it must adhere to the principles regulating criminal provisions. Of importance here is the 
principle of legality which comprises substantive justice and strict legality. 95 Under the fmmer, 
the paramount interest is to protect the society from the transgressions of an individual, 
irrespective of whether their conduct had already been crirninalized.96 This doctrine is 
articulated as the nullum crimen standard. 
95 Cassese A, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013,24. 
96 Cassese A, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013,24. 
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The principle of legality encompasses three main features including the principle of non-
retroactivity, specificity and the prohibition of analogy.97 The next section will explain how 
Article 28E fails to satisfy these features. 
4.1.1 Specificity 
Criminal rules must be as detailed as possible to clearly indicate to the addressee the conduct 
prohibited. This contains the objective elements of the crime and the requisite mens rea. 98 The 
Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the Furundzija case expounded on the principle of specificity. 
The Court was trying to arrive at an accurate definition of rape and therefore, had to rely on 
general principles of International Criminal Law (ICL) and those principles common to major 
legal systems.99 Article 28E does not achieve the required threshold of specificity because it 
does not define in detail the objective or subjective elements. Thus, the Court is likely to find 
itself in a similar position as in the Furundzija case. 
4.1.2 Non-retroactivity 
Rules may not cover acts performed prior to their enactment unless such rules are favourable 
to the accused. This prevents arbitrary punishment. Nevertheless, the nature of ICL requires 
that rules are continuously identified, clarified or spelled out to have legal determinacy. This 
characteristic should be reconciled with the principle of non-retroactivity. 100 The ICTY in 
Hadzihasanovic provided that the Courts may not create a new offence, with a new actus reus 
or mens rea they may only adapt the provisions to the prevailing social conditions. The 
extension of the legal ingredients of an offence must be restricted to the essence of the offence 
and secondly must be reasonably foreseeable by the accused. 101 
4.1.3 Ban on Analogy and Extensive Interpretation 
The definition of the crime cannot be extended by analogy. 102 Criminal courts may not extend 
the purport of a criminal rule to a matter that is unregulated by law (analogia legis). This 
97 'General principles of international criminal law', ICRC Advisory Service on International Humanitarian law 
31 October 2013 https://www.icrc.org/en/documentlgeneral-principles-international-criminal-law-factsheet on 16 
January 2019. 
98 Cassese A, International Criminal Law, 28. 
99 The Prosecutor v Furundzija, Decision on Defence Filings Subsequent to the 
Close of The Appeal Hearing, ICTY Trial Chamber Judgment, 2000, 177. 
10° Cassese A, International Criminal Law, 30. 
101 The Prosecutor v Hadzihasanovic and others, Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to 
Command Responsibility, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 2003, 34. 
102 'General principles of international criminal law', ICRC Advisory Service on International Humanitarian 
law31 October 2013 https:l/www. icrc.org/en/document/general-principles-international-criminal-law-factsheet 
on 16 January 2019. 
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principle applies to both customary norms and treaty law such as the Malabo Protocol. 
Definition of crimes are to be strictly constmed in order to exclude isolated cases. 103 In case of 
any ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the accused. 104 This does not bar 
the Court from interpreting or clarifying the elements of crimes nor does it preclude the 
progressive development of the law by the court. However, the ICTY trial chamber in the 
Vasilijevic case explained this principle by stating that: 
"[U]nder no circumstances may the court create new criminal offences after 
the act charged against an accused either by giving a definition to a crime 
which had none so far, thereby rendering it prosecutable and punishable, or by 
criminalising an act which had not until the present time been regarded as 
criminal." 105 
Analysing Article 28E using these pre-conditions reveals disconcerting inadequacies. The 
Court will have a difficult time trying to balance the interests between clarifying the provision 
and not extending the defmition by analogy. It is already evident that the six theoretical 
provisions under Article 28E have diverse real-world expressions. 
4.2 The Prospective Challenges of Enforcing and Applying Article 28E in Africa 
4.2.1 The Different Policy Responses of the AU has created a conflicting 
normative framework 
Before the adoption of the Malabo Protocol, the AU has taken a stance against the varying 
forms of UCGs including some of the f01ms that have found their way into the Malabo 
Protocol. The concern here is that the responses have produced contradictory norms that will 
not assist the Merged Court in interpreting the provision. 106 
For each of the different instances ofUCG under Article 28E, the AU has had a different policy 
position. Over the years these have included condemnation, suspension, imposition of 
sanctions and the deployment of envoys. 107 This is irrespective of the fact that the Lome 
103 Josef Altstotter and others, US Military Tribunal Nuremburg 1947,284-285. 
104 Article 22(2) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, UNTS 2187. 
105 Prosecutor v Vasilijevic, 196 citing Tihomir Blaskid, Case No. IT-95-14-T Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, 
2000, 193-204. 
106 Ulf Engel, "Unconstitutional Changes of Government: New AU Policies in Defence of Democracy", South 
African Association of Political Studies, Stellenbosch, 1--4 September 2010; Albab T, 'African Court of Justice 
and Human and Peoples' Rights: Prospects and Challenges of Prosecuting Unconstitutional changes of 
Government as an International Crime', 19. 
107 Omotola J, 'Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa: What Implications for Democratic 
Consolidation?' ,35. 
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Declaration and the Addis Charter both set forth frameworks for dealing with each of the 
situations. Needless to say, this challenge has also been brought about by the prevailing attitude 
by HoSG at the time when an UCG occurs. For instance, military coups were prevalent in the 
1990's but did not draw strong condemnation from the AU until 2000 when the Lome 
Declaration was adopted. 108 
With respect to military coups, the response has usually been condemnation, calling on 
putschists either to immediately revert to the old order or conduct elections within six 
months.109 In Guinea, AU responded by condemning the coup on 23 December 2008, 
suspended the countly on 29 December 2008 and went ahead to impose sanctions on l 7 
September 2009. In Guinea-Bissau, the AU only condemned the coup and sent a special envoy 
to mediate the conflict but did not suspend the country. This is contrasted to Madagascar, where 
the AU applied all applied different responses, including condemnation of the coup and 
imposition of sanctions on 17 March 2009 and the eventual suspension of the country on 20 
March 2009. 110 Additionally, the AU also established International Contact Groups (ICG) in 
Mauritania, Guinea and Madagascar through which the union coordinates and harmonises its 
efforts with the UN. 111 
Regarding constitutional amendment for tenure prolongation, the responses were equally 
varied. In 2009, the Nigerien President Tanja unilaterally made a decision to dissolve the 
elected Parliament in order to facilitate the removing of term limits. The AU did not intervene 
until the military took over the govemment. 112 It is evident that this form of UCG does not 
evoke strong reactions from the AU unless it is superseded by another action such as military 
intervention. 
Concerning the failure of incumbents to step down, the approach by the AU has been 
conciliatory. 113 On two separate occasions, it involved mediation and a power-sharing 
agreement. For example, Kenya in 2008, the conflict was mediated by Kofi Annan leading to 
the conclusion of a power sharing agreement between the incumbent and the opposition. In 
108 Sou are I, The AU and the challenge of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, 4. 
109 Omotola J, ' Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa' 32 
11 0 Omotola J, 'Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa' 33 
111 Ulf Engel, "Unconstitutional Changes of Government: New AU Policies in Defence of Democracy", South 
African Association of Political Studies, Stellenbosch, 1-4 September 2010. 
112 Daniel K, 2010, 'Why the Coup in Niger May be a Good Omen' 22 February. Available at 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel. php?ID= 177096 on 21 January 2019. 
113 Omoto1a J, 'Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa' 34. 
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Zimbabwe, a similar process was facilitated by Thabo Mbeki. 114 However, the most 
momentous of this form of UCG was in Ivory Coast when Laurent Gbagbo refused to step 
down as President after the run-off election of 28 November 2010. 115 This was despite the 
international recognition of Alassane Ouattara as the winner of the election. He held onto power 
in the face of sanctions from the AU Peace and Security Council and a statement from the UN 
Secretary-General. He proposed a power-sharing agreement where he would remain President 
and Ouattara becomes the Prime Minister. Before Ouattara could assume power, Gbagbo had 
to be forcefully removed with the assistance of UN peace-keepers, French LICORNE troops 
and pro-Ouattara forces. 116 
It is wotthy to note that between December 2018 and January 2019 there have been three 
different allegations ofUCGs in Africa. This section will analyse the three different responses 
of the AU in this regard. The first was over the December 30 presidential election in DRC. This 
election had been postponed twice and maned with violence and logistical enors.117 For 
example, in the capital Kinshasa about two thirds of the polling machines had been destroyed 
by fire. The AU raised 'serious doubts' over the conformity of the announced results and the 
actual results of the ballot boxes. 118 Secondly, the attempted military coup against the president 
Ali Bongo, who happened to be out of the country at the time due to ill-health. 119 The 
perpetrators of the coup stated their objectives to be the mental and physical inability of the 
president to rule the country. 12° Finally, the popular protests in Sudan against military 
dictatorship. The protests were escalated by the steep increase in food prices disclosing a deep-
sited political dissatisfaction by the public. 121 
114 Tendi, Blessing-Miles, 2010, 'Power sharing: the new military coup' I June. Available at 
http://www. guardian.co. uk/ commentisfree/20 1 0/j un/0 1 I ethiopia -africa-powershari ng 
115 https://www .economist.com/baobab/20 11104/06/gbagbo-refuses-to-budge on 21 January 2019. 
116 Omotola J, 'Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa' 35. 
117 Mohamed H et a! , Democratic Republic of the Congo: Elections 2018, 28 December 2018, available at 
https: / /www .a I j azeera.com/indepth/i nteracti ve/20 18/ 12/democratic-repub lie-congo-elections-?0 18-
181228120427725.html on 28 January 2019. 
11 8 Em mot R, EU AU signal support, but no acclaim, for Congo President-elect, 22 January 2019, available at 
h ttps:/ /www .reu ters.com/articl e/us-con go-election -eu/ eu -au-signal-support -but-no-acclaim-for -congo-p resident-
elect-idUSKCN1PGIJW on 28 January 2019. 
119 'What You Need to Know about the Attempted Coup in Gabon' 7 January 2019 available at 
https: //www.aljazeera.com/news/20 19/0 l /attempted-coup-gabon-190 l 07071230267 .html on 28 January 2019 . 
120 Goma Y, '2 Plotters Killed as Gabon Government Puts Down Attempted Military Coup' 7 January 2019 
available at http: /ltime.com/5495933/gabon-government-militarv-couo/ on 28 January 2019. 
121 'Respond to 'legitimate grievances' of Sudanese people, UN human rights experts urge, following protests', 
28 December 2018, available at https: //news.un .org/en/stmy/20 18/12/1029441 on 28 January 2019. 
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Demonstrated above is the varying responses of the AU to each of these three recent situations. 
Taking into account the normative and legislative framework against UCG, including the yet 
to be enforced Malabo Protocol. It is apparent that the response dwindles in strength with 
regards to the situations that are not clear-cut. For the Gabon military coup, there was firm 
condemnation because it is an outright breach of the law, however, for less straightforward 
popular protests and ambiguous elections, there were feeble reactions. This is likely to be 
replicated when adjudicating over Article 28E. 
The significance of these varied responses is that they produce divergent policy outcomes. 
Discernibly from evaluating the three forms of UCG above, the outcomes have been different 
depending on the position the AU took. This is not sustainable from the perspective of a 
criminal court for the sole reason that it will manifest inconsistencies and ambiguities which 
will defeat the purpose of having a legal framework in the first place. 
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4.2.2 The Implication on the Right to Self-determination and Popular Protests 
The AU lists democracy as one of its founding principles. 122 This includes the right to self-
deteimination which has been guaranteed in other AU regional instruments. The consternation 
is how this right relates with UCG. The Banjul Charter provides 'All People's right to freely 
dete1mine their political status and pursue their economic and social development. .. Colonized 
and oppressed peoples shall have the rights to free themselves from the bond of domination'. 123 
This right has been exercised in different forms in the past that would currently constitute a 
form ofUCG in the present. The AU has not clarified the situation in instances ofUCG where 
a section of the citizenry claims to be exercising their democratic will to free themselves from 
oppression. This was illustrated in 2013 by the Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was ousted 
by the military. This was a complex situation because on the one hand, a democratically elected 
president was removed through military might on the other millions of Egyptians demanded 
for the president's resignation. The Army claimed to have been responding to the people's 
demands. 124 The response was to initiate a ceasefire dialogue that would quell the tension in 
the country. 125 
Noteworthy, popular uprising was deleted from the definition of UCG during the drafting 
process. 126 This was done in the interest of protecting the right to protest. 
Furthermore, this consideration is coupled with the principJe of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of a State. This principle is enshrined in the UN Charter, precluding the UN and other 
States from intervening in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
State involved. 127 Authors writing in this field have argued that the transfer of criminal 
jurisdiction to a regional court over what would otherwise constitute intervention is a breach 
of internationallaw. 128 However, this position is untenable with regards to UCG in Africa. By 
122 Article 4, Constitutive Act. 
123 Article 20, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter''), 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67 /3 
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58. 
124 Yihdego Z, 'Democracy, Peoples' Uprising and Unconstitutional Change of Government in Egypt: The African 
Union Principles and Responses', European Journal of International Law, (20 13 ). 
125 Yihdego Z, 'Democracy, Peoples' Uprising and Unconstitutional Change of Government in Egypt: The African 
Union Principles and Responses'. 
126 Amnesty International, Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications of the Merged and Expanded 
African Court, 2016, 16. 
127 Article 2(7), Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945. 
128 Novogrod J, 'Internal Strife. Self-Determination and World Order', in Bassiouni M (ed.) International 
Terrorism and Political Crimes 1975, I 03 ; Shaw M, International Law, 6ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2008, 1152. 
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dint of African States concluding treaties on this matter shows a collective interest to combat 
the crime regionally. The natural progression is to establish a common criminal court with 
authority over crimes of common concern. This is not in breach of international law. 129 
Nonetheless, the principle of non-intervention is fully sub-servient to the sovereign will of 
States. They are at liberty to seek assistance, and in doing so quell any f01m of insunection on 
their tenitory. 
Table 3: Number of African Protests by Year 
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Source: Branch A, Mampilly Z, Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change, 68. 
4.2.3 Complementary Jurisdiction and the Political Will of States 
A further issue that arises with enforcing Article 28E is that of jurisdiction of the Court vis-a-
vis the jurisdiction of the State. Similar to the ICC, the Merged Comt will only have jurisdiction 
to try the crimes in its mandate where the State is unable or unwilling. 13° For the State Parties 
to have the capacity to try the crimes in the Protocol they must include them in their municipal 
law. The likelihood that a State will prosecute an incumbent government for any of the f01ms 
ofUCG is slim. 131 This is because by the time a person or party successfully completes a form 
of UCG then they have a powerful hold over the politics of the State. 
119 Wilt I-1 , 'Unconstitutional Change of Government: A New Crime within the Jurisdiction of the African Criminal 
Court', 30, Lei den Journal of International Law, (2017), 981. 
130 Article 46H, Protocol on Amendments of the Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
131 Albab T, 'African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights: Prospects and Challenges of Prosecuting 
Unconstitutional changes of Government as an International Crime', 44. 
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Moreover, it is for this reason inter alia that the ratification process of this Protocol has been 
very slow, eighteen years since the adoption date, the Protocol is still awaiting the fifteenth 
ratification. This demonstrates a clear lack of political will to be governed by the Protocol, 
drawing from the questions brought up by States on the appropriateness of a Court to entertain 
such a 'politically sensitive matter'. 132 The success of the Merger Court is brought into 
question. This is an unfortunate regression from the positive steps taken by State parties of the 
AU to reject and condemn UCG in the region. 133 
Table 4: Number of States that have ratified the Malabo Protocol 
• No. of Ratifications 





4.3 Modern forms of UCG that have not been provided for under Article 28 
4.3.1 Popular Protests 
Popular protests were excluded from the definition of UCG because they are believed to 
collectively represent the will of the people and to prohibit them would be unduly repress the 
voices of the common citizen. The following data is an illustrative sample that protests still 
132 Wilt H, 'Unconstitutional Change of Government: A New Crime within the Jurisdiction of the African Criminal 
Court', 985. 
133 Albab T, 'African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights: Prospects and Challenges of Prosecuting 
Unconstitutional changes of Government as an International Crime', 39 
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present a challenge to peaceful order in many countries in Africa. Possibly an indication that 
their govetmnents are not legitimate in the first place. Additionally, rarely is it a phenomenon 
that can be contained in one territory. Different scholars have considered forms of UCG as 
infectious, capable of spreading across territories. 134 Thus, the concerns of the AU considering 
this form of UCG are valid, however, to tum a blind eye to the problem is not to make it 
disappear. 




!Benin ~011, 2014 
!Botswana ~011 
Burkina Faso 011, 2014 
Burundi ~014 
1Cameroon ~008,2012 
iCentral African Republic 006, 2013, 2014 
iChad ~010, 2014 
1
C6te d'Ivotre ~010, 2011 






Kenya 2008, 2010, 2013 
!Lesotho 2011 
Liberia ~011 
Libya ~011, 2013 
!Madagascar ~009, 2010, 2013 
!Malawi ~011 
Mali ~012, 2013 
Mauritania ~011, 2012,2013 
!Mauritius ~011 
Morocco ~011, 2012, 2013 




Senegal 2011, 2012 
!Somalia ~010,2014 
134 Wilt H, 'Unconstitutional Change of Government: A New Crime within the Jurisdiction of the African Criminal 
Court', 985; Branch A, Mampilly Z, Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change, London, Zed Press, 
2015 66. 
31 
[South Africa 2009,2010,2011,2014 
[Sudan 2011, 2012, 2013 





[Western Sahara ~011 
[Zimbabwe ~005,2007,2008 
Source: Branch A, Mampilly Z, Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change, 65 
4.3.2 Fraudulent Elections 
Article 28E of the Malabo Protocol only provides for an incumbent's refusal to relinquish 
power it does not address the incumbent holding fraudulent elections to maintain the power. 
Alternatively, it does not presuppose a situation where any other prospective candidate may 
interfere with the democratic process of transferring power to illegitimately gain success. 
Noteworthy, Article 28E makes no mention of conducting elections. This is a peculiar oversight 
given that majority of democratic Africa makes use of elections to transfer power to subsequent 
governments. Moreover, the occurrence of fraudulent elections is more common than those 
that are free and fair as the data suggests. Examples of African States that have held fraudulent 
elections in the past include Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008 and Ethiopia in 2010 where the 
incumbent secured 99.6% of the total seats in Parliament. 135 
Similar to popular protests, this is an instance ofUCG that is always heavily debated between 
opposing parties. The issue of their legitimacy or lawfulness will depend on the perspective of 
the party that has been addressed. This was the case in the countries which have experienced 
these modem forms, the winning party confirms the results while the opposition claims fraud 
and unlawful interference. Therefore, these two forms are just as significant as the five 
provided for under Article 28E. 
135 Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 20I I: Democracy under stress, 2011,7. 
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Table 6: Comparison between Countries with fraudulent elections and free and fair elections 
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Conclusion 
From the data presented it is apparent that that popular protests are frequent and diverse in 
Africa with the most recent one taking place in Sudan. This should prompt a response from the 
AU on the position of popular protests in relation to UCG. The clarification of this matter 
among others, might increase the political will of States to ratify the Malabo Protocol. 
Moreover, the insufficiency of the Malabo Protocol is highlighted by the number of countries 
engaging in fraudulent elections. This requires the drafters to consider the content of the 
provision, examining whether it will suffice without running the risk of over-legislating. 
An assessment of the prospects of the Merged Court is discouraging when viewed in light of 
all the challenges that the Malabo Protocol faces. These challenges require the drafters to return 
to the drawing board and make necessary amendments that will yield positive results. The 
prohibition of UCG has been referred to as quintessential custom in Africa, therefore, the 
codification of this through the myriad of treaties only serves as evidence. 136 Insurgencies 
although occurring in the territory of one State have been regarded to have a contagious effect 
capable of generating into widespread oppression. Examples of civil strife crossing borders in 
Africa abound. 137 From the domino effect during the Arab spring, 138 the civil war for the hunt 
136 Abass A, 'Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and Challenges', 34. 
137 Wilt H, 'Unconstitutional Change of Government: A New Crime within the Jurisdiction of the African Criminal 
Court' , 984. 
138 Prosecutor v AI Gaddaji and AI Senussi, Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah AI -Senussi, 
ICC, 2013,70. 
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of blood diamonds in SieiTa Leone139 and the Lord Resistance Army moving its camps from 
Uganda to Sudan and the Central African Republic. 140 It is against this backdrop that the fight 
against UCG must catTy on. 
139 Meredith M, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence, Free Press, London, 2006 524-545. 
140 UNSC S/RES/2262 (2016), Resolution Extending Sanction on Central African Republic, 12. 
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CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
It is evident that UCGs and all their various forms constitute a real impediment to the 
development of Africa. They establish dictatorships, subvert democratic governance, preclude 
the exercise of the rights of people to constitute or change their government, and lead to the 
violations of human rights. 141 The AU through its Conventions and Declarations has sought to 
purge the Continent of this vice. Their commitment to see the eradication of UCG was 
solidified through the adoption of the Malabo Protocol. This was not an easy venture by any 
measure and the challenges are apparent both in the text of the legal provisions and the 
reception and application by member States to the AU. 
This chapter concludes the study by providing the key findings of the research and the 
recommendations that might possibly solve the issues that have been raised throughout the 
paper. 
Restating the Initial Problem 
The main criticism of Article 28E of the Malabo Protocol is that it lacks precision by offering 
a nanow approach to combating UCGs in Africa. The objective of this paper was to outline the 
various issues that arise from this nanow approach. The provision has left out a number of 
possible UCGs such as popular protests and fraudulent elections. Furthermore, the AU has been 
inconsistent with their responses to UCG this in tum makes the resolution of the cnme 
ineffective. Not to mention that it sets a bad precedent for the Merged Court. 
Research Findings 
This paper was guided by three research questions. First, it sought out to investigate the 
reasoning behind Article 28E, tracing its development from the documents adopted by the 
OAU such as the Lome Declaration until its current formulation in the Malabo Protocol. 
Understanding how the provision came to acquire its cunent form explains the reason for its 
inadequacies. This is because it was not a new invention by the drafters, instead it was a 
replication of previous similar provisions. This study found that when the OAU was operational 
14 1 Odinkalu, Chidi A.,'Conceming Kenya: The Current AU Position on Unconstitutional Change of 
Government', Open Society Initiative Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP), 2008, . 
Available at http:// www.afrimap.org/engl ish/ images/paper/ AU&UnconstitutionaiChangesinGov 
t Odinkalu Jan08.pdf on 30 January 2019. 
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its main concern was principles such as state sovereignty and territorial integrity, this was thus 
reflected in its documents. Aspects such as UCG took a backseat before it was brought to the 
front by the AU. Additionally, Article 28E was replicated from documents that were not 
criminal statutes. Therefore, the drafting did not meet ICL standards and this create new 
challenges when the crime is being prosecuted before the Merged Court. 
Secondly, if the content of Article 28E meets the threshold set for criminal provisions. The 
nature of criminal provisions is that they are required to abide by the principle of legality. 
Legality is divided into three features and they include specificity, non-retroactivity and the 
ban on analogy and extensive interpretation. From the foregoing discussion, it became 
imminent that the development of this crime by the Merged Court might infringe this principle. 
This is due to the fact that a brief look at the provision reveals there is not much guidance that 
it can provide. 
Consequently, a conflict will arise between two possible rules of legal construction. The literal 
rule which requires a plain reading of the text will defeat the purpose of prohibiting UCG. It is 
not by any stretch of the imagination that crimes, particularly international crimes, are ever 
evolving taking on new forms that had not been pre-conceived. These novel forms are likely 
to be left out by a strict literal interpretation. Then there is the golden rule that looks to the 
purpose of the text by interrogating the intention of the drafters. The challenges with this 
method of interpretation is that it is said to infringe on the separation of powers because the 
judges can easily usurp the function of law makers. 142 This is a conflict that can be resolved by 
amending Article 28E to comply with the requirements of legality. 
Thirdly, taking a forward-looking approach to the matter, what are the prospective challenges 
that the AU and the Merged Court will face when applying Article 28E. This evaluation brought 
out a number of issues. The AU's inconsistent approach to handling UCG has contributed to 
its ineffectiveness. There is low political will to ratify the Malabo Protocol as evidenced by the 
empirical data. This could be due to a number of reasons, the uncertainty over the material 
jurisdiction of the Merged Court, the obligations that state parties will have once they ratify the 
Protocol among others. This question further revealed that Atticle 28E is insufficient because 
the data shows numerous instances of UCG that would subsequently be left out of the purview 
of the Merged Court. 
142 London and North Eastern Railway v Berriman (1946) AC 278 (UK) 
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Some Final Remarks 
To conclude, it is worthy of applause the strides that the AU has made not only in the fight 
against UCG but also in trying to uphold human rights. The Malabo Protocol promises to be a 
visionary statute, the first of its kind, legislating for regional crimes that have not previously 
been provided for in any international or regional statute. There were initial concerns that this 
was only a reactionary measure to exclude the jurisdiction of the ICC over African States. 
However, it has gone far and beyond to become a torchbearer in regional crimes. This is not a 
task that the AU should take lightly because the rest of the world will use this as a stepping 
stone to develop this area of law. Thus, it would be prudent to ensure that the AU responsibly 
discharges the task that has been placed on its shoulders. 
Recommendations 
This study concludes with the following recommendations on the concrete actions to be taken: 
Legal Recommendations 
a) A broader definition of unconstitutional changes of government should be designed to 
include all illegal means of accessing and maintaining power. 143 This is necessary to 
cover conduct that has currently been left out by the narrow defmition. 
b) Accordingly, the definition should exhibit sufficient flexibility that will take into 
account the development in the means of changing governments. This will prevent the 
situation described in the research findings where the hands of the Court are tied when 
interpreting the Statute. 
c) The AU should consider formulating an Elements of Crime document which is 
explanatory in nature similar to that of the ICC. 144 Article 9 of the Rome Statute 
provides for the Elements of Crime document which shall assist the ICC in interpreting 
and applying the crimes over which it has jurisdiction. 145 The Elements of Crime 
document breaks down the constituent elements of all the crimes provided for in the 
Rome Statute. Therefore, a similar document for the Malabo Protocol will not only cure 
the deficiencies under Article 28E but also all the other 13 crimes provided for. This 
will effectively guide the interpretation and application of the Malabo Protocol. 
143 Forander K, ' Dealing with unconstitutional changes of government- The African Union way' , Unpublished 
LLM Thesis, University of Lund, 2010,71. 
144 Paragraph 1, Elements of Crime, International Criminal Court publication, RC/11, 2010. 
145 Article 9, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
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Policy Recommendations 
a) The AU ought to overcome the inconsistency in responding to UCG which in effect 
creates a double standard and a contradictory normative framework. This approach is 
not feasible if the perpetrators of UCG are to be held accountable. Instead it sets a bad 
precedent for the policy position of the AU in subsequent UCGs. 
b) A regional policy is required to agree on some of the terms set under Article 28E. For 
example, acceptable presidential term limits and refusal to relinquish power. This 
would reduce the current breadth of the scope to practical limits. 
c) African institutions should strengthen the respect for constitutional transfer of power to 
facilitate the development of States. This can be done by making regional instruments 
necessary for UCGs, such as the Lome Declaration and ACDEG, binding. Thereafter, 
lobbying and encouraging the ratification and domestication of these instruments. 
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